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PENNSYLVANIA'S DEVELOPING CHILD
CUSTODY LAW
EMANUEL A. BERTINI
VANESSA ANTHONY KLEINff
I. INTRODUCTION
THE AREA OF LAW GENERALLY REFERRED TO AS
"DOMESTIC RELATIONS" or "family" law has recently wit-
nessed a marked flurry of activity in Pennsylvania. In particular, the
specialized field of child custody litigation has received increased at-
tention in Pennsylvania courts.' The Pennsylvania Superior Court
has been in the forefront of change, tearing down artificial presump-
tive barriers and demanding a full-scale hearing on all the facts of the
case. 2 If trial counsel fail in their duty to explore all relevant factors
in a custody dispute, the superior court requires that the trial court
itself must develop the case. 3 Moreover, the superior court will not
hesitate to reverse and remand if both counsel and the trial court
have ignored its directives regarding full explanation of the issues and
proper procedures. 4 It is therefore apparent from such judicial vigor
that Pennsylvania courts are determined to serve the best interests
and welfare of a child embroiled in a custody dispute.
Because of this welcomed activism on the part of the courts, it is
now necessary for both trial court and counsel to become more
thorough in the preparation and trial of custody cases. Thus, it is the
purpose of this paper to discuss the evolution of the new develop-
ments in Pennsylvania custody law in the hope that an understanding
of the law's doctrinal roots will aid the practitioner in solving the
complex problems in this field.
f Partner, Pechner, Dorfman, Wolffe, Rounick & Cabot, Norristown, Pennsylvania. B.A.,
Moravian College, 1966; J.D., University of Richmond School of Law, 1969. Member, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia Bars.
ti Associate, Pechner, Dorfman, Wolffe, Rounick & Cabot, Norristown, Pennsylvania.
B.A., Beaver College, 1976; J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1979. Member, Pennsyl-
vania Bar.
1. For an excellent discussion on the topic of child custody litigation, see 1 PA. FAM.
LAW., Jan. 1980, at 1-10.
2. See notes 6-122 & 171-74 and accompanying text infra.
3. See Lewis v. Lewis, - Pa. Super. Ct..,-, 406 A.2d 781, 784 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, - Pa. Super. Ct. , 406 A.2d 781 (1979) (reversed and
remanded to receive evidence of living conditions at mother's home and of her ability to care
for child); Commonwealth ex rel. Cox v. Cox, 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 388 A.2d 1082 (1978)
(reversed and remanded to receive evidence of living conditions, health of mother, relative
financial situations of parties, and children's preferences).
(752)
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II. PRESUMPTIONS IN CUSTODY LITIGATION
A. The Demise of the Tender Years Doctrine
Since the early nineteenth century 5 and until recently, child cus-
tody cases in Pennsylvania were governed by the "tender years doc-
trine.'"6 This doctrine, based upon the presumption that the child's
best interests ordinarily would be served by granting custody to the
natural mother of a child of tender years, 7 was developed to ease the
task of resolving emotionally charged and factually complex custody
cases." The so-called tender years presumption could be overcome
by presenting compelling contrary evidence 9 such as moral deficiency
on the part of the mother, 10 abandonment of the child," or severe
neglect and abuse. 12
5. In Pennsylvania, the tender years doctrine is said to have had its origins in Common-
wealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813). See Commonwealth ex rel. Keller v. Keller, 90 Pa.
Super. Ct. 357, 359 (1927). In Addicks, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "[iut is to
[the children], that our anxiety is principally directed; and it appears to us, that considering
their tender age, they stand in need of that kind of assistance which can be afforded by none so
well as a mother." 5 Binn. at 521.
The children involved in the Addicks decision were ages seven and ten. Id. at 520. The
tender years doctrine applied to children until about age 14, but not necessarily in every in-
stance. See Commonwealth ex rel. Shurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 249, 115 A.2d
395, 397 (1955). As the children grew older, less weight was accorded to the tender years
presumption and more to the preference of the child. See Williams v. Williams, 223 Pa. Super.
Ct. 29, 32, 296 A.2d 870, 871 (1972).
6. See Commonwealth ex rel. Nevin v. Wells, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 98, 101, 292 A.2d 515,
516 (1972).
7.. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 355, 299 A.2d 243,
245 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Keller v. Keller, 90 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 359 (1927).
8. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lee v. Lee, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 157, 374 A.2d 1365,
1366 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 215, 166
A.2d 60, 63-64 (1960) (child of tender years should be committed to care and custody of mother
unless compelling reasons appear to the contrary); Commonwealth ex rel. Buchner v. Barr, 173
Pa. Super. Ct. 124, 126, 95 A.2d 355, 356 (1953) (natural mother is prima facie entitled to
custody except for compelling reasons); Commonwealth ex rel. Lucchetti v. Lucchetti, 166 Pa.
Super. Ct.' 530, 531, 72 A.2d 617, 618 (1950) (though not absolute, courts recognize propriety of
committing child of tender years to mother absent compelling reasons to the contrary).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Shaak v. Shaak, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 122, 126, 90 A.2d
270, 272 (1952) (loose morals coupled with neglect of child); In re Latney, 146 Pa. Super. Ct.
20, 23, 21 A.2d 521, 523 (1941) (low moral standards with bad general reputation).
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Doberstein v. Doberstein, 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 102,
105, 192 A.2d 154, 156 (1963) (custody of children awarded to father when mother abandoned
retarded child but kept sister); Commonwealth ex rel. Bosco v. Olson, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 319,
322-23, 98 A.2d 213, 214-15 (1953) (custody awarded to foster parents when parent delivered
child to them unconditionally).
12. See, e.g., In re Davis, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, 517-18, 352 A.2d 78, 79 (1975) (custody
awarded to paternal grandparents when child was abused by mother's paramour); Common-
wealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 49, 52, 91 A.2d 910, 912 (1952), rev'd on
other grounds, 374 Pa. 172, 97 A.2d 350 (1953) (custody awarded to foster parents where chil-
dren were ill-fed, abused, and generally not given proper care). The superior court, in Harry,
listed the following as "essential" ingredients of a proper home: good housekeeping, proper food
and clothing, proper supervision, religious training, and maternal interest in the child's welfare.
Id. at 51, 91 A.2d at 911.
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The force of the tender years doctrine began to ebb when, in
1972, in Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh,13 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the presumption was "merely the vehicle
through which a decision respecting the infant's custodial well-being
may be reached where factual considerations do not otherwise dictate
a different result." 14 This new approach, which treated the tender
years presumption not as a material "right," but as a procedural
means of allocating the burden of proof, 15 was based on the belief
that the presumptive approach "precluded an impartial examination of
all of the relevant factors, and subordinated that which should be the
sole purpose of hearing: to determine what is in the best interest of
the child." 16 Under the Parikh approach, the mother would only be
awarded custody under the doctrine if the judge determined, after a
full hearing, that the child's best interests would be served equally
well by living with either of the parents. 17
The erosion of the tender years doctrine continued with the de-
cision in Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson. 18 In Spriggs, a
plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the
doctrine should be eliminated even as a procedural device since it
violated the equal rights amendment (ERA) of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. 19 The court criticized the doctrine as being predicated
upon a "stereotypic" view of the "roles of men and women in a mari-
tal union." 2 0 More importantly, in regard to the best interests of the
child standard, the court stated:
13. 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).
14. Id. at 109, 296 A.2d at 625. See also In re Davis, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, 518, 352 A.2d
78, 79 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 144, 146-47, 331
A.2d 665, 667 (1974).
15. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lee v. Lee, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 157, 374 A.2d 1365,
1366 (1977).
16. Id.
17. Commonwealth ex rel. Veihdeffer, v. Veihdeffer, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 449, 334 A.2d
613, 614 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 235-36, 312
A.2d 58, 62 (1973).
18. 470 Pa. 290, 299-300, 368 A.2d 635, 639-40 (1977) (plurality opinion).
19. Id. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 28. Section 28 of article I provides: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of
the sex of the individual." Id. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's version of the ERA, see gener-
ally Momjian, Family Law and the Pennsylvania ERA, Symposium: Recent Developments in
Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. REV. 677 (1980).
20. 470 Pa. at 299, 368 A.2d at 639. It should be noted that the primary basis for the
Spriggs court's ruling was the failure of the superior court to accord proper weight to the
opinions of the common pleas court judges who had heard the witnesses. See id. at 299, 368
A.2d at 639. The plurality stated, however, that the lower court "relied heavily on the 'tender
years doctrine'' in reaching its decision to award custody to the mother. Id. The supreme court
went on to say that
[w]hether the tender years doctrine is employed to create a presumption which requires
the male parent to overcome its effect by presenting compelling contrary evidence of a
[VOL. 25: p. 752
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Courts should be wary of deciding matters as sensitive as questions
of custody by the invocation of "presumptions." Instead, we be-
lieve that our courts should inquire into the circumstances and re-
lationships of all the parties involved and reach a determination
based solely upon the facts of the case then before the court. 2 1
Because Spriggs was decided by only a plurality of the court, the
decision left unclear the current status of the tender years presump-
tion. The superior court, however, has interpreted the Spriggs deci-
sion as abolishing the doctrine.22 For example, although it did not
rely upon Spriggs for its holding, the superior court in Common-
wealth ex rel. Lee v. Lee 23 construed Spriggs as eliminating the ten-
der years presumption even as a procedural device.2 4 Furthermore,
the court in McGowan v. McGowan,2 5 relying upon both Spriggs and
Lee, 2 6 held that the plurality opinion in Spriggs was controlling 2 7 and
that the ERA had eliminated the tender years presumption. 28 Fi-
nally, a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently acknowl-
edged that Spriggs had discarded the tender years doctrine.2 9
B. The Remaining Presumptions
In addition to its impact upon the tender years doctrine, the
Spriggs decision arguably abrogated the established policy preference
for awarding custody of a child to a resident parent over a nonresi-
dent parent. 30 The Spriggs plurality stated that this "rule of prefer-
ence was obviously more tenable in the days of a less mobile society.
In today's accessible and communicative world, the validity of this
particular nature, . . .or merely as a makeshift where the scales are balanced, . . .such a
view is offensive to the concept of equality of the sexes which we have embraced as a
constitutional principle within this jurisdiction.
Id. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 639 (citations omitted). Cf Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 539, 318
A.2d 324 (1974) (ERA held to preclude presumption that father must accept principal burden of
child support).
21. 470 Pa. at 300, 368 A.2d at 640.
22. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lee v. Lee, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 374 A.2d 1365 (1977);
notes 23-29 and accompanying text infra.
23. 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 374 A.2d 1365 (1977).
24. See id. at 161, 374 A.2d at 1367. The Lee court, after reviewing the lower court's
application of the tender years presumption, concluded that "[t]his was error even under the
law as it was before the supreme court decided [Spriggs]." Id.
25. 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 41, 374 A.2d 1306 (1977).
26. Id. at 44, 374 A.2d at 1308.
27. Id. at 44 n.1, 374 A.2d at 1308 n.1.
28. Id. at 44, 374 A.2d at 1308, citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa.
536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
29. Ellerbe v. Hooks, No. 78-463, slip op. at 6 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980).
30. See 470 Pa. at 299, 368 A.2d at 639.
1979-1980]
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proposition is open to question." 31 Spriggs, however, had no direct
effect on several other presumptions or policy preferences which are
a part of custody law. Because their status is not as certain as it was
prior to Spriggs,3 2 a review of these presumptions or policy prefer-
ences may be helpful.
One such presumption which is deserving of discussion holds
that against a third party, "the natural parent has a prima facie right
to custody which may be forfeited [only] if convincing reasons appear
that the child's best interests will be served by awarding custody to
someone else." 33  This presumption is of questionable strength,
however, because given the appropriate circumstances, courts will
not hesitate to find "convincing reasons" to overcome this prima facie
31. Id. As with the question of the constitutional validity of the tender years presumption,
however, the Spriggs court's discussion of the resident guardian preference did not form the
basis for its decision. See note 20 supra.
32. See notes 33-64 and accompanying text infra.
33. Commonwealth ex rel. Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 589, 590-91,
384 A.2d 936, 937 (1978), citing In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 274, 376 A.2d
648 (1977); In re Custody of Myers, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 255, 363 A.2d 1242 (1976). Accord,
Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. Ct. 227, 385 A.2d 992 (1978). This approach seems to have
had its genesis in In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. at 281, 376 A.2d at 652. In
Hernandez, acceptance of the "prima facie right-convincing reasons" approach was based upon
the court's conviction that this formulation of rights and burdens properly requires the third
party to show cause why custody should not be granted to the parent, but avoids placing too
great a burden on that party. Id. at 285, 376 A.2d at 654. The Hernandez court characterized
the "convincing reasons" burden as "midway between the state's burden ('clear necessity') and
the one parent's burden in a case where the dispute is with the other parent (preponderance of
the evidence)." Id. Nevertheless, the court stated that "the evidentiary scale is tipped ....
hard, to the parent's side." Id. at 286, 376 A.2d at 654. Finally, the court concluded that, under
this approach, the reasons presented by the third party must relate to the best interests of the
child, not "merely to some characteristic of the parent that the third party or hearing judge may
regard unfavorably." Id.
The acceptance of this approach by the Hernandez court invoked an explicit rejection of
two other formulations. See id. at 283-86, 376 A.2d at 653-54. The court first rejected the rule
that gives "the parents ... a 'primary right' to custody of the child, although the right is not
absolute and must yield to the child's best interest." Id. at 283, 376 A.2d at 653. The court
found this approach unacceptable partly because the phrase "'primary right' connotes a property
interest as though the child were a chattel," but more specifically because the formulation
lacked a clear standard enunciating the type of evidence necessary to defeat the parent's right.
Id. Similarly, the court rejected the articulation that "absent 'compelling reasons' to the con-
trary, it will be 'presumed' that the child's best interest will be served by being raised by his
parents." Id. (citations omitted). The court found that this formulation mistakenly focused atten-
tion on the rights of the parties, instead of on the best interests of the child. Id. In addition, the
court deemed the burden of proof placed on the third party to be too great under this second,
rejected approach. Id. at 285, 376 A.2d at 653.
It should be noted that a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly adopted
the Hernandez decision in the recent case of Ellerbe v. Hooks, No. 78-463, slip op. at 2 (Pa.
Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980). See notes 34 & 37-45 and accompanying text infra. But see Ellerbe v.
Hooks, No. 78-463, slip op. at 1-5 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980) (Flaherty, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the presumption in favor of the natural parent should be abolished). For a
discussion of Justice Flaherty's concurring opinion, see notes 42-45 and accompanying text in-
fra. In view of the majority's holding in Ellerbe, it is submitted that the Hernandez decision
would have to be modified or overruled in order for the presumption to be abolished.
[VOL. 25: p. 752
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right and will award custody to grandparents,3 4 aunts and uncles,3 5 or
foster parents.36
In Ellerbe v. Hooks,37 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
reconsidered this presumption in light of Spriggs and held that it
remains unchanged.38 Ignoring the language in Spriggs which had
inveighed against the use of presumptions in custody litigation,3 9 the
court stated that the Spriggs plurality had overturned the tender
years doctrine solely because it violated the ERA. 40 The court
noted, by contrast, that the presumption in question in Ellerbe was
34. See Ellerbe v. Hooks, No. 78-463 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980). In Ellerbe, a father
sought custody of his daughter who had lived with her grandmother since she was less than two
years old. Id., slip op. at 7. At the time of the trial court's order awarding custody to the
grandmother, the child was 11 years old. Id. The supreme court upheld the trial court's order
citing the child's preference to remain with her grandmother and the numerous relationships
the girl had established during the years with her grandmother, her neighborhood, and her
classmates, which would have been disrupted by a contrary award. Id. See also In re Davis, 237
Pa. Super. Ct. 516, 352 A.2d 78 (1975). In Davis, a child living with her mother and the
mothers paramour showed signs of having been abused. Id. at 517-18, 352 A.2d at 79. The
mother admitted slapping and spanking the child and testified that her paramour had slapped
the child and, on one occasion, had thrown thd child against a wall. Id. The court concluded
that the evidence demonstrated a general lack of concern for the child and upheld the custody
award to the paternal grandparents. Id. at 517-19, 352 A.2d at 79. Cf Fisher v. Rabinowitz,
102 Mont. Co. L.R. 227 (1977) (grandparents who refused to release child to mother bent on
putting child up for adoption held to stand in loco parentis and, hence, were entitled to same
consideration as natural parent vis-h-vis third-party adoption agency).
35. See Commonwealth ex rel. Murphy v. Walters, 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 418, 392 A.2d 863
(1978). In Murphy, the court reviewed the lower court's finding that the natural mother evi-
denced a lack of concern for her two children. Id. at 423, 392 A.2d at 866. The superior court
concluded that the lower court was justified in finding that the mother lived with her children
in a trailer littered with dog and cat manure, kept the children dirty and hungry, often had late
night or overnight visitors causing neighbors to complain, and was concerned more about her
eligibility for welfare than the well-being of her children. Id. at 421-23, 392 A.2d at 865-66. In
granting custody to the children's aunt and uncle, the court remarked:
[A]lthough a parent has the legal right to custody of his or her child, this right is not
absolute and will be forfeited by misconduct or other factors which substantially affect .the
welfare of the child. . . . The child's welfare is the paramount consideration, to which all
other considerations including the rights of parents, are subordinate.
Id. at 423, 392 A.2d at 866 (citations omitted).
36. See Commonwealth ex rel. Fritz v. Doe, 25 Cumb. L.J. 186 (C.P. Pa. 1975). The
mother in Fritz had relinquished her infant son to an adoption agency which subsequently
placed the child with foster parents. Id. at 187-88. Reconsidering her decision to give up the
child, the mother later sought, and was granted, an order vacating the relinquishment decree.
Id. at 189. Since the order vacating the decree did not direct that custody of the child be
returned to the mother, she instituted a habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 189 n.4. At the time
of the hearing on the petition, the child was approximately 32 years old. Id. at 187. In finding
that the best interests of the child required that he be left with his foster parents, the court
relied upon testimony of the life-long, adverse effects on the child which might result from
separating him from his "psychological parents." Id. at 191. The court also took cognizance of
the natural mother's "immaturity and instability." Id. at 193. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Ban-
kert v. Children's Services, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 556, 563, 307 A.2d 411, 415 (1973) (reversing
and remanding for further evidence on psychological impact of removing child from foster par-
ents' custody in contest between foster parents and adoption agency).
37. No. 78-463 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980).
38. Id., slip op. at 6.
39. See 470 Pa. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 640; notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
40. No. 78-463, slip op. at 6-7 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980).
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one granted to either parent, regardless of sex, and thus, did not
violate the ERA. 4'
Justice Flaherty concurred in the majority's result (which left the
child in the care of her grandmother), but took issue with the majori-
ty's continued acceptance of the presumption. 42 Reiterating the lan-
guage of Spriggs which questioned the wisdom of using presumptions
to determine custody between parents, 43 Justice Flaherty queried
why they should be any more acceptable in a contest between a par-
ent and a third party. 44  In either case, he maintained, the sole
question should be what is in the best interests of the child.4 5
It is submitted that the significance of the Ellerbe decision lies in
the majority's award of custody to the grandmother, and in Justice
Flaherty's call in his concurring opinion for abolition of the presump-
tion in favor of the natural parent. The majority in Ellerbe upheld the
determination of the court of coinmon pleas 46 and affirmed the award
of custody to the grandmother. 47 In so doing, the supreme court
reversed the ruling of the superior court,48 concluding, after conduct-
ing its own review of the record, that convincing reasons appeared to
rebut the presumption in favor of the natural parent.49
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the more equitable
approach is that taken by Justice Flaherty. Although it is not violative
of the ERA to invoke presumptions in custody disputes between
natural parents and a third party under Spriggs,50 the Spriggs court
warned against deciding matters as sensitive as custody by resorting
to presumptions. 51 Further, the majority approach is seemingly in-
consistent with a number of recent cases which urge that all facets of
a custody dispute should be examined thoroughly. 52  Finally, it is
submitted that the "natural parent presumption" is inconsistent with
the best interests standard and is beginning to erode in the same way
that the tender years presumption fell into disfavor.5 3
41. Id., slip op. at 7.
42. No. 78-463, slip op. at 1 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980) (Flaherty, J., concurring). Justice
Nix joined in the concurring opinion. Id., slip op. at 5 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
43. Id., slip op. at 2-3 (Flaherty, J., concurring). See text accompanying note 21 supra.
44. No. 78-463, slip op. at 3 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980) (Flaherty, J., concurring).
45. Id., slip op. at 5 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
46. Hooks v. Ellerbe, No. 255488 (C.P. Phila. Oct. 26, 1977).
47.. No. 78-463, slip op. at 7 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980).
48. Hooks v. Ellerbe, 257 Pa. Super. Ct. 219, 390 A.2d 791 (1978).
49. No. 78-463, slip op. at 7 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 16, 1980).
50. See 470 Pa. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 640; notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
51. See 470 Pa. at 299-300, 368 A.2d at 640; notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
52. See notes 6-28 and accompanying text supra; notes 65-122 & 171-74 and accompanying
text infra.
53. See notes 13-29 and accompanying text supra. For an in-depth analysis of the Ellerbe
decision, see I PA. FAM. LAw., Sept. 1980, at 64-73.
[VOL. 25: p. 752
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Another doctrine, most likely left unaffected by Spriggs, reflects
a "policy preference" for keeping siblings together whenever possi-
ble. 54 This preference is based on the judicial belief that close ties
among siblings should remain unbroken. 55 Thus, it has been stated
that "[i]n the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, children
should be raised together." 56
Finally, there exists a rebuttable presumption that a child born
while a husband and wife are living together is a legitimate child.57
This presumption has been characterized as "one of the strongest
known to the law," 5s requiring evidence of "overwhelming weight" in
order to overcome it. 5 9 Like the preference for uniting siblings, this
presumption probably remains unaffected by Spriggs.
The presumptions discussed above are really no more than policy
preferences which can be readily rebutted given the appropriate cir-
cumstances.6 ° For this reason, they have been less of an obstacle to
54. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Steuer v. Steuer, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 302, 309, 368
A.2d 732, 735 (1976) (custody of son awarded to mother, therebv reuniting brother with
half-brothers); Bowser v. Bowser, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 6, 302 A.2d 450, 452 (1973) (custody of
daughter awarded to father, thereby reuniting sisters); Scheeler v. Ruby, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 772,
777-778 (C.P. Franklin County 1977) (custody of both children retained by mother who refused
to separate them; court considered presence of half-sisters as stabilizing factor). But see Com-
monwealth ex rel. Fetters v. Albright, __ Pa. Super. Ct. _ _ 405 A.2d 1260, 1261
(1979) (custody awarded to father over maternal grandparents, thereby splitting two brothers
from half-brothers).
55. Commonwealth ex rel. McKee v. Reitz, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 125, 129, 163 A.2d 908, 911
(1960), citing Commonwealth ex rel. Reese v. Mellors, 152 Pa. Super. Ct. 596, 33 A.2d 516
(1943).
56. Commonwealth ex rel. Steuer v. Steuer, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 302, 307, 368 A.2d 732,
735 (1976) (citations omitted).
57. See Commonwealth ex rel. Ermel v. Ermel, 259 Pa. Super. Ct. 219, 221-23, 393 A.2d
796, 798 (1978); H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.3,
at 172-73 (1968).
58. Cairgle v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 255, 77 A.2d
439, 442 (1951). The Cairgle court went on to state that the presumption "can be overcome
only by proof of facts establishing non-access or that the husband was impotent or had no sexual
intercourse with his wife at any time when it was possible in the course of nature for the child
to have been begotten." Id. (citations omitted).
For a recent application of this presumption, see Commonwealth ex rel. Ermel v. Ermel,
259 Pa. Super. Ct. 219, 221-23, 229, 393 A.2d 796, 798, 801 (1978) (putative father awarded
visitation rights because of mother's failure to rebut the presumption).
59. See Cairgle v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 258, 77
A.2d 439, 443 (1951); note 58 supra. In Cairgle, certain minor children of a widow sought
Workmen's Compensation benefits. 366 Pa. at 251, 77 A.2d at 440. The right of the children to
recover depended upon whether they were the legitimate children of the decedent. Id. Since
the court found that the wife of the decedent had been living in a meretricious relationship with
another man away from her husband, that the children were given the name of the other man,
and that the other man had supported the children, the court held that the presumption of
legitimacy was rebutted, even though there was evidence that the children's mother had en-
gaged in sexual relations with her husband. Id. at 258, 77 A.2d at 443. Similarly, in Buiston v.
Dodson, 257 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 390 A.2d 216 (1978), a man claiming to be the natural father of a
child, born while its mother was married to another man, was able to overcome the presump-
tion. Id. at 3-4, 390 A.2d at 216.
60. See notes 30-59 and accompanying text supra.
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sound judicial decisionmaking than the tender years doctrine had
been. Nonetheless, their continued existence and application could
result in a decision that is contrary to the best interests of the
child. 61  In view of the abrogation and criticism of other presump-
tions by Pennsylvania courts, 62 it is submitted that more of, them will
lose their force in the coming years. As the United States Supreme
Court remarked in Stanley v. Illinois:63
[P]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than in-
dividualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when
it explicitly disclaims present relatives in deference to past for-
malities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important
interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand. 64
III. EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
The paramount concern in any custody case is the determination
of what is in the best interests of the child. 65 This standard necessi-
tates a thorough consideration of those circumstances which will aid
the child's physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual development. 66
All evidentiary principles applicable to custody cases, therefore, have
for their purpose the furtherance of such an inquiry.
A. Burden of Proof
In the litigation of most legal issues, there is usually a controlling
principle of law that governs the disposition of the controversy and a
standard of proof that must be met in order for a party to prevail. 67
Since the controlling principle of law in custody cases is the best
interests of the child standard, the party who convinces the court by
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Fetters v. Albright, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 405
A.2d 1260 (1979). The court in Fetters was faced with a conflict between two presumptions: 1) a
parent's prima facie right to custody vis-a-vis a third party; and 2) the policy of keeping siblings
together. Id. at , 405 A.2d at 1261. See notes 33-56 and accompanying text supra. The
court resolved this dilemma in favor of the father's prima facie right to custody and, thereby,
separated his children from their stepbrother-a result arguably against the children's best
interests. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -. , 405 A.2d at 1262.
62. See notes 5-31 and accompanying text supra.
63. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state statute presuming unmarried fathers to be unsuitable and
neglectful parents held unconstitutional).
64. Id. at 656-57 (citations omitted).
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 367 Pa. 553, 80 A.2d 829 (1951);
Commonwealth ex rel. Cutler v. Cutler, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 82, 369 A.2d 821 (1977); In re
Davis, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, 352 A.2d 78 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon 1965)
(primary issue in custody proceeding is the best interest and welfare of the child).
66. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 108-09, 294 A.2d 625, 627 (1972);
In re Davis, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, 518, 352 A.2d 78, 79 ,1975).
67. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 336-339 (2d ed. 1972).
[VOL. 25: p. 752
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a preponderance of the evidence that he or she will serve the child's
best interests ordinarily prevails.6 8 In In re Custody of Hernan-
dez, 69 Judge Spaeth elaborated on this axiom, writing that "It]he con-
cern . . . is entirely with the child's physical, intellectual, moral, and
spiritual well-being. . . . The burden of proof is shared equally by the
contesting parents; thus the hearing judge awards custody according
to what the preponderance of the evidence shows." 70
In view of the complexity and detail inherent in custody litiga-
tion, it is suggested that practitioners should keep sharply in focus
the best interests principle and the fact that the burden of proof is
shared. Since custody cases are often complex and can become mired
in details, such attention to the issue at hand can only benefit the
client and foster the appreciation of the court.
B. The Right to Cross-Examine the
Authors of Reports
It is settled practice in custody cases that a court will admit the
reports of investigators, social workers, and doctors only if the offer-
ing party brings the author of the report into court for examination
and cross-examination. 7 1 As the court in Kessler v. Gregory 72
stated: "In a custody case, 'reports of investigators, agents, and doc-
tors cannot be received in evidence, or considered by the court, in a
contested case. The investigators, agents, doctors, etc. must them-
selves be produced, sworn and examined as witnesses and be subject
to cross-examination'". 73  It is significant that the superior court did
not rely on traditional evidentiary rules, such as the hearsay rule or
the opinion rule, to justify the exclusion. Rather, the court developed
a special rule for custody cases, focusing on the fact that without
cross-examination, the record would be insufficient to allow the court
to meet its appellate function in determining whether the child's best
68. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
69. 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977). For a discussion of Hernandez, see note 33
sup ra.
70. 249 Pa. Super. Ct. at 280, 376 A.2d at 651 (1977) (citations and footnotes omitted). See
also Rummel v. Rummel, ___ Pa. Super. Ct -. -- - 397 A.2d 13, 15 (1979) (quoting
Judge Spaeth's i rmulation with approval).
71. See Kessler v. Gregory, ___ Pa. Super. Ct . . 412 A.2d 605, 607 (1979);
Wood v. Tucker, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 461, 463, 332 A.2d 191, 192 (1974).
72. - Pa. Super. Ct. __, 412 A.2d 605 (1979).
73. Id. at , 412 A.2d at 607, quoting Wood v. Tucker, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 461, 463, 332
A.2d 191, 192 (1974), quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Oncay v. Oncay, 153 Pa. Super. Ct. 569,
570, 34 A.2d 839, 839 (1943). See also Rummel v. Rummel, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 397 A.2d
13 (1979) (holding that it was erroneous not to allow mother to examine report or cross-examine
agency which prepared the report).
1979-19801
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interests had been served. 74 Thus, the superior court, in order to
perform its reviewing function in custody cases, seems to require that
the record below must manifest a full explanation of all the facts
through cross-examination. 75
C. Res Judicata
Pennsylvania courts are reluctant to interfere with an existing
custodial arrangement in which the child is flourishing. 76 Only a
substantial change in circumstances affecting the best interests and
welfare of the child will justify modification of a prior custody or-
der. 77  Moreover, and most importantly, the issues of the relative
fitness of the parties and the best interests of the child may not be
relitigated on the basis of facts known at the time of the initial hear-
ing. 78
In spite of these rules, there is, and perhaps should be, much
controversy over the applicability of res judicata in custody cases. 79 It
has been stated that all doctrines, policies, and procedural dogma
must yield to the best interests and welfare of the child.8 0 Thus,
there are significant custody cases where res judicata has been men-
tioned but not strictly followed in the sense that it precludes future
proceedings on the case.81  For example, in Commonwealth ex rel.
Crawford v. Crawford,8 2 the court delineated the role of the doc-
trine and asserted:
There is . . . no merit to the argument that the doctrine of res
judicata bars further action in the instant case. Under ordinary
principles of res judicata, a judgment or decree in the absence of
fraud, is conclusive between the parties not only as to matters de-
cided therein but those which might have been properly de-
74. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 412 A.2d at 607.
75. Id. See also Rummel v. Rummel,-Pa. Super. Ct._ , 397 A.2d 13 (1979).
76. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Cutler v. Cutler, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 82, 369 A.2d 821
(1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Foster v. Foster, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 436, 311 A.2d 663 (1973);
Commonwealth ex rel. Goldbaum v. Goldbaum, 161 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 53 A.2d 746 (1947).
77. See Commonwealth ex rel. Swanson v. Barry, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 244, 184 A.2d 370
(1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Heller v. Yellin, 174 Pa. Super. Ct. 292, 101 A.2d 452 (1953).
78. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Hey v. McCurdy, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 22, 24-25, 184 A.2d 290,
291 (1962).
79. See H. CLARK, supra note 57, § 17.7. For a discussion of the related issues of modifica-
tion and the applicability of full faith and credit to custody awards, see generally Frank, The
End of Legal Kidnapping in Pennsylvania: The Development of a Decided Public Policy, Sym-
posium: Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Family Late, 25 VILL. L. REV. 784 (1980).
80. Commonwealth ex rel. Crawford v. Crawford, 170 Pa. Super. Ct. 151, 154, 84 A.2d
237, 238 (1951).
81. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text infra.
82. 170 Pa. Super. Ct. 151, 84 A.2d 237 (1951).
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cided .... However, res judicata has little place for strict applica-
tion where the welfare of the child is involved. . . . It is settled
that the welfare of children is the prime consideration in regulating
custody and this principle has tempered the harsh application of
the rule of res judicata.8 3
In Wick v. Wick, s 4 an appeal was taken by the aunt, uncle, and
grandparents of a minor child from an order of the lower court which
had granted visitation rights to these appellants.8 5  The appellants
maintained that the failure of the appellee mother "to appeal the ear-
lier visitation order should have precluded her from relitigating appel-
lants' visitation rights in a second proceeding, or at least should have
required her to show a substantial change in circumstances affecting
the child's welfare." 8  In an express rejection of appellants' urging
that res judicata should apply where the welfare of the child is in-
volved, the court stated:
The paramount concern in any case involving visitation must al-
ways be the welfare and best interests of the child. . . .With this
in mind, it would be inappropriate for us to find that the mother in
the case before us is barred from seeking a change in visitation,
simply because she failed to appeal an order which she at first
agreed to thinking the order at the time to be in the best interests
of the child.8 7
Therefore, other than precluding relitigation of the same set of facts
which existed and were known at the first hearing,8 8 the doctrine of
res judicata plays virtually no role in custody cases in Pennsylvania.
D. Testimonial Privileges and the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Child custody practitioners have long concerned themselves with
circumventing the assertion of privilege by a witness whose testimony
could clarify certain issues and even control the eventual outcome of
the dispute. Damaging out-of-court admissions, statements, and con-
duct of a party bearing upon his or her fitness as a custodial parent
and other information relating to the physical, mental, emotional, and
spiritual condition of specific parties have always been sought after as
potent and relevant evidence.8 9 On the other hand, litigants whose
83. Id. at 154, 84 A.2d at 238 (citations omitted).
84. - Pa. Super. Ct. - , 403 A.2d 115 (1979).
85. Id. at __, 403 A.2d at 115-16.
86. Id. at 403 A.2d at 116.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
89. See H. CLARK, supra note 57, § 17.4.
1979-1980]
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cases would suffer from the admission of this evidence have at-
tempted to shield it from the court through the assertion of various
privileges.
The determination of whether a privileged relationship exists
necessitates an interpretation of pertinent privilege statutes. 90 The
number and scope of recognized privileges varies from state to
state. 9 ' In Pennsylvania, prior to the enactment of the new Divorce
Code (Code),92 confidential communications to marriage counselors
were not privileged, 93 whereas communications to licensed
psychologists were. 9 4 Under the new Code, this distinction is
abolished. 9 5 But since some counseling sessions are conducted with
both parties present-leaving the adverse party free to divulge the
entire conversation-the effect of the psychologist's privilege is prac-
tically nullified. 96  Communications to psychiatrists, who are medical
doctors, are likewise privileged. 9 7 However, since the medical doc-
tor's narrow privilege extends only to "communications which tend to
90. See notes 92-99 and accompanying text infra.
91. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 67, § 101.
92. Divorce Code, Act No. 1980-26, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 49 (Purdon) [hereinafter cited as
DIVORCE CODE].
93. See Note, A Suggested Privilege for Confidential Communications With Marriage Coun-
selors, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 266 (1957). It should be noted, however, that many marriage coun-
selors are also physicians or psychologists and, therefore, communications to such individuals
would be privileged tinder the statutes applicable to them in those capacities. See notes 94-97
and accompanying text infra.
94. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (Purdon 1979). This section provides in pertinent
part:
No person who has been licensed . . . to practice psychology shall be, without the written
consent of his client, examined in any civil or criminal matter as to any information ac-
quired in the course of his professional services in behalf of such client. The confidential
relations and communications between a psychologist and his client shall be on the same
basis as those provided or prescribed by law between an attorney and client.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
95. DIVORCE CODE, supra note 92, § 703. The new Divorce Code has a privilege provision
which provides that "[c]ommunications of a confidential character made by a spouse to an attor-
ney, or a qualified professional shall be privileged and inadmissible in evidence in any matrimo-
nial cause unless the party concerned waives such immunity." Id. Qualified professionals
include all persons who, by virtue of their training and experience, are able to provide counsel-
ing. Id. § 104. This expressly includes marriage counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists, social
workers, ministers, priests, and rabbis. Id. Although the scope of this privilege is unclear, it
would seem that it is inapplicable to custody cases because a) a custody dispute may not qualify
as a "marital cause," and b) the fact that mental states are in issue would most likely constitute a
waiver. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text infra.
96. See Commonwealth ex rel. Gilham v. Gilham, 177 Pa. Super. Ct. 328, 110 A.2d 915
(1955).
97. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5928 (Purdon 1979). This section provides:
No physician shall be allowed, in any civil matter, to disclose any information which he
acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, which shall blacken the character of the patient, except
in civil matters brought by such patient on account of personal injuries.
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blacken the character of the patient," 98 it is difficult for the psychia-
trist to assert the privilege effectively in court. 99
The recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in In re B,100
however, may have rendered some of the foregoing issues concerning
privilege moot. In that case, a psychiatrist asserted the doctor-patient
privilege and refused to produce his records bearing upon the fitness
of a mother. 101 The doctor appealed the lower court's decision to
hold him in contempt to the superior court which then transferred
the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the grounds that the
contempt sanction was criminal in nature and, therefore, subject to
the supreme court's jurisdiction. 10 2 The supreme court ruled that,
although the doctor-patient privilege did not prohibit disclosure of
medical records,' 0 3 the patient's records were safeguarded by the
right to privacy-a right protected by both the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions and having its roots in a penumbra of con-
stitutional provisions.' 04 The court remarked:
The right of privacy derived from these constitutional underpin-
nings protects the privacy of intimate relationships like those exist-
ing in the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child
rearing. . . .As such, the protection extends not only to the home,
...but also to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room, or
as is otherwise required to safeguard the right to privacy involved
in such intimate relationships. 10 5
1. Applicability of In re B to Private Custody Cases
The issue of privilege arose in In re B in the context of a juvenile
delinquency proceeding 106 in which a mother's hospital records were
subpoenaed to assist the court in determining who should have cus-
tody over her delinquent son. 10 7  It is submitted, however, that In
re B cannot be cited as controlling in a private custody case for sev-
eral reasons.
98. 1(d.
99. See id. The psychiatrists' privilege may now be broader under the new Code if the
communications are sought to be admitted in a marital cause. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note
92, § 104; note 95 supra.
100. 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978).
101. Id. at 475, 394 A.2d at 420-21.
102. Id. at 476, 394 A.2d at 421.
103. Id. at 481, 394 A.2d at 423.
104. Id. at 484, 394 A.2d at 425, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); U.S.
CONST. amend. I, Ill-V, IX; PA. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 1-4, 7-9, 11, 20, 23, 25-26.
105. 482 Pa. at 482, 394 A.2d at 424, citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
106. 482 Pa. at 475, 394 A.2d at 420.
107. Id. at 485, 394 A.2d at 426.
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First, In re B is inconsistent with the recent trend in this Com-
monwealth to require a full and open hearing when the trial court has
at stake the best interests and welfare of the child. 10 8  This move-
ment is premised on the belief that all information that bears upon
the best interests issue is both useful and necessary for a resolution of
the dispute. 10 9 It is submitted that In re B is contrary to this trend
and may be a step in the wrong direction. By-subordinating the
state's interest in the placement of juveniles to the parent's right of
privacy, the supreme court, at least in the juvenile delinquency con-
text, has effectively barred the admission of certain kinds of evidence
which would be probative of the fitness of the parent. 110 Therefore,
if In re B can be distinguished and held not to apply in private cus-
tody disputes, it should have limited effect.
A second reason for concluding that In re B is inapplicable to
private custody cases is the fact that juvenile delinquency proceedings
and private custody disputes are clearly dissimilar in nature. A pri-
vate custody suit between parents of a minor child contains factors
much different from those in a juvenile delinquency case, where one
party is the state and the proceeding is of a more adversary charac-
ter."' A classic illustration of the differences in nature and treat-
ment of these proceedings is found in Lewis v. Lewis (Lewis II)," 2
wherein the superior court held that a child in a custody proceeding
108. See Kimmc v. Kimmey, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 409 A.2d 1178 (1979) (remanding
for full explanation of lower court's decision to award custody to mother); Rupp v. Ropp,
Pa. Super. Ct. -, 408 A.2d 883 (1979) (remanding for evi'dence of effect of mother's mere-
tricious relationship on child, as well as for evidence of child's preference for particular parent
and condition of each parent's premises): Lewis v. Lewis, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 406 A.2d
781 (1979) (remanding to obtain evidence regarding mother's ability to care for child and living
quarters of each parent); Sipe v. Shaffer, --- Pa. Super. Ct. __ 396 A.2d 1359 (1979)
(stating that judge "must make a comprehensive inquiry"); Commonwealth ex rel. Cox v. Cox,
255 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 388 A.2d 1082 (1978) (remanding for further testimony about mother's
physical condition as well as the financial and living conditions of each party). See notes 65-75
and accompanying text supra; notes 171-74 and accompanying text infra.
109. See cases cited note 108 supra. For a detailed analysis of these cases, see Note, supra
note 1.
110. See 482 Pa. at 486, 394 A.2d at 426. The In re B court stated:
We applaud the court's concern about proper placement for a juvenile; the court's efforts
to place the child with one of his parents are commendable.
We recognize that our holding may, in some cases, make it more difficult for the
court to obtain all the information it might desire regarding members of the juvenile's
family, or about the juvenile's friends, neighbors, and associates. The individual's right of
privacy, however, must prevail in this situation.
Id. The dissent of Chief Justice Eagen is more in accordance with the trend in custody cases.
He observed that "[because of the important state interest in treatment and welfare of
juveniles, I do not believe the right of privacy should prevail under the circumstances of this
case." Id. at 494, 394 A.2d at 430 (Eagen, C.J., dissenting).
111. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
112. __ Pa. Super. Ct. , 414 A.2d 375 (1979). For further discussion of Letvis 11, see
notes 145-47, 179-85 & 214-16 and accompanying text infra.
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does not have the absolute right to counsel that a child in a delin-
quency proceeding has. 113 The Lewis II court declared:
[Juvenile] [p]roceedings ... require appointment of counsel for
the children. There, however, a third party [the state] is involved.
The child may be adjudicated delinquent or deprived or removed
from his natural parents.
Here there is no inherent adversarial process with regard to
the children .... With counsel appointed in all cases, we see a
danger of placing the child in a position adversarial to his parents,
where no such adversarial atmosphere would be present at the
hearing. Most custody cases reflect a genuine parental love for the
children. 114
A third factor which distinguishes In re B from private custody
cases, and, therefore, renders it inapplicable to them, is that, since
parental fitness is necessarily a key issue in a private custody case,
the contesting parent, by actively seeking custody, puts his or her
mental, physical, and emotional health in issue-much like the plain-
tiff victim who seeks damages for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident is deemed to have waived all statutory and constitutional
privileges. 115 A trial court which must make a custody award should
not be foreclosed from learning about the total health and stability of
a litigant claiming not only to be a fit parent, but to be the more fit
parent.
In a significant statement on the question of voluntary waiver,
the supreme court in In re B recognized that
[t]he mother might have voluntarily submitted to psychiatric
examination by a court-appointed psychiatric expert who could
evaluate her ability to provide a proper home for her child, or who
could, based on the findings of such examination, recommend ap-
propriate alternative placement. Neither the doctor-patient
privilege created by statute, nor the constitutionally protected zone
of privacy would bar such an evaluation because the mother would
not be relying detrimentally on either the doctor-patient privilege
or upon her right of privacy if she chose to submit to such an
evaluation. 116
Therefore, it is submitted that if a party freely chooses to submit to
the ardors of a custody contest, the crucial issue becomes the fitness
113. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 414 A.2d at 378-79.
114. Id.
115. See McCav v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 447 Pa. 490, 291 A.2d 759 (1972) (admitting
preexisting physical conditions as relevant to damages sustained in automobile accident).
116. 482 Pa. at 486, 394 A.2d at 426 (emphasis in original), citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977) (state-instituted reporting system for dangerous drugs held not to be invasion of
privacy).
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of the parents to serve the best interests and welfare of the child, and
hence, the otherwise important societal interests of privilege and pri-
vacy must yield to the best interests standard. For this reason, and
because of the fact that In re B was a juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing, it should not be applied in the private custody context.
E. The Evidentiary Role of Meretricious Relationships
In recent decisions, Pennsylvania appellate courts have refused
to permit trial courts to deny visitation or custody rights to a parent
solely because that parent is living with another person in a mere-
tricious relationship. 1 17 If the lower court fails to analyze carefully
the effect of the meretricious relationship upon the child, the matter
will be remanded on appeal.""
In many instances, the child's relationship to the parent's com-
panion is close, warm, and generally beneficial to the child's wel-
fare. 119 Continued exposure of the child to the relationship between
the parent and companion may actually be in the best interests and
welfare of the child and may constitute a valid reason to award cus-
tody of the child to that parent. 120 On the other hand, after carefully
investigating the effect of such a relationship upon the youngster, the
trial court may conclude that it will have a serious, adverse effect
upon the child. In this situation, the court will refuse to award cus-
tody to the parent living with a companion who is not his or her
spouse and may also order the noncustodial parent's visitation to take
place without the presence of his or her paramour.'12 It is clear,
then, that merely establishing the existence of a meretricious rela-
tionship is of little probative value in a child custody case in Pennsyl-
vania unless the relationship has a demonstrated effect on the "best
interests" issue itself. 122
IV. THE IN-COURT EXAMINATION OF THE CHILD
A. Apparently Clear Requirements
As should be evident by now, in recent years, the Pennsylvania
courts have become increasingly concerned with establishing a com-
117. Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, 468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976); Common-
wealth ex rel. Sorace v. Sorace, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 344 A.2d 553 (1975).
118. See Rupp v. Rupp, - Pa. Super. Ct. _, 408 A.2d 883 (1979).
119. See Commonwealth ex rel. Staunton v. Austin, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 194, 223 A.2d
892, 894 (1966).
120. Id.
121. See Drum v. Drum, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 397 A.2d 1192 (1979).
122. See notes 117-21 and accompanying text supra.
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plete record upon which to base a sound custody decision. 123 This
concern has focused particularly upon the procedures for taking the
testimony of the child. In Commoniwealth ex rel. Morales v.
Morales,12 4 for example, the court reversed and remanded the case
for a new hearing because the lower court had entered a custody
order without placing the testimony of the children on the record and
without permitting counsel for both sides to be present in chambers
while the testimony was being heard. 125  Specifically, the court
deemed the decision of the court below to be unsupportable "due to
the incorrect procedure followed in hearing the testimony of the chil-
dren." 126 Further, the court held that "[i]f [the children's] tes-
timony is to be taken out of the presence of the contending parties,
counsel should be present and have an opportunity to examine them,
. . * and their testimony should be on the record." 127 Similarly, in
the subsequent case of Xildiams v. Williams, 128 the superior court
held that where the preference of the child is the principal reason for
a particular award of custody, the child's testimony must be on the
record in order to support a finding of the child's preference. 129
In Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster,130 the superior court
recognized the frequent failure of lower courts to heed directives and
to analyze all alternatives comprehensively in determining which
123. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
124. 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 294 A.2d 782 (1972). The Morales decision involved an appeal
taken by the appellant-mother from an order of the court of common pleas which awarded
custody of three children, ages 10, 11, and 12, to the appellee-father. Id. at 374, 294 A.2d at
782. The superior court held that the lower court's order was not supported by the record
because the oldest child had not been allowed to testify on the record by the lower court which
reasoned that the testimony of the children had already been heard in chambers. Id. at 375,
294 A.2d at 783.
125. Id. at 375, 294 A.2d at 783.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 375-76, 294 A.2d at 783 (footnote omitted), citing Snellgrose Adoption Case, 432
Pa. 158, 166 n.3, 247 A.2d 596, 600 n.3 (1968).
128. 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 29, 296 A.2d 870 (1972).
129. Id. at 33, 296 A.2d at 872. In Williams, a husband and wife each sought custody of the
couple's two children, ages 8 and 13. Id. at 30, 296 A.2d at 870. After the separation, the
children remained with the mother pursuant to the terms of the separation agreement. Id. at
31, 296 A.2d at 871. However, both parents engaged in "child snatching." Id. In ruling in favor
of the father, the lower court accorded great weight to the preference of the children to stay
with their father. Id. at 32, 296 A.2d at 871. The superior court, however, held that the lower
court was remiss for failing to include the children's testimony in the record. Id. at 33, 296
A.2d at 872. The court then reversed and remanded for a hearing in which the testimony of
each child was to be made a part of the record. Id. For a discussion of child-snatching, see
Frank, supra note 79.
130. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973). In Grillo, the mother sought custody of her
three daughters, ages 6, 9, and 11. Id. at 230-31, 312 A.2d at 60. By agreement, custody of the
children had been granted to the father, with whom the children had lived for three years prior
to the hearing. Id. at 231, 312 A.2d at 60.
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solution will serve the child's best interests.' 31 As the cause of this
failure, the court singled out the policy of invoking presumptions to
settle child custody decisions.132  In order to guard against an inordi-
nate use of presumptions and to ensure a complete record, the court
listed certain procedures to be followed in custody cases. 133 First, if
testimony of the children is to be taken out of the presence of the
contending parties, counsel should be present and have an opportu-
nity to examine them. 134 Second, since a case will be remanded if
an important issue or piece of evidence is not included in the rec-
ord,135 the children's testimony should be contained in the rec-
ord.136 Third, a judge in a custody case should give a complete
explanation of all reasons underpinning a custody award in a com-
prehensive and clear opinion.' 37 Finally, the hearing judge's opinion
should mention important facts on the record and indicate how much
weight those facts were given. 138 Although these requirements seem
to be clearly defined, there have been a number of superior court
cases in this area which portend a flexible approach to the rules
stated above. 1 9 However, these decisions have just added confusion
to an area which would best be served by clear rules.
B. Areas of Confusion
1. The Necessity of a Transcript of the In-Camera Interview
Although the language in Morales, Williams, and Grillo appears
to dictate with certainty that failure to comply with stated require-
131. Id. at 232, 312 A.2d at 60.
132. Id. at 232-33, 312 A.2d at 60-61.
133. Id. at 234-37, 312 A.2d at 62-63.
134. Id. at 235, 312 A.2d at 62, citing Snellgrose Adoption Case, 432 Pa. 158, 166 n.3, 247
A.2d 596, 600 n.3 (1968).
135. See 226 Pa. Super. Ct. at 235, 312 A.2d at 62, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Gifford v.
Miller, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 269, 273-74, 248 A.2d 63, 66 (1968).
136. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. at 235, 312 A.2d at 62, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Morales v.
Morales, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 375-76, 294 A.2d 782, 783 (1972). For a discussion of Morales,
see notes 124-27 and accompanying text supra.
137. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. at 235, 312 A.2d at 62, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Fox, 216
Pa. Super. Ct. 11, 17, 260 A.2d 470, 472-73 (1969).
138. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. at 237, 312 A.2d at 63. Applying these rules to the facts of the case,
the Grillo court stated:
Perhaps the most important facts not mentioned in the hearing judge's opinion are
what he was told by the three children. At the close of the hearing the children were
individually questioned by the judge in chambers. Counsel were offered the right to be
present but both declined. The substance of these conferences does not appear either in
the transcript or in the opinion, nor does the opinion indicate the weight the hearing
judge gave to what the children told him. The fact that we therefore do not know what
the children told the judge by itself necessitates remand.
Id. at 237-38, 312 A.2d at 63 (footnote omitted).
139. See notes 140-52 and accompanying text infra.
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ments will result, on appeal, in reversal and remand, 140 this rule has
not always been strictly followed. In Gunter v. Gunter,'4 1 the hear-
ing judge spoke to a seven-year-old boy in chambers in the presence
of the attorneys, but no transcript of the in-chambers proceeding was
made.' 42  Although the court held that it was error for the hearing
judge not to order a transcript, it refused to announce a "prophylactic
rule" which would automatically call for a reversal and remand where
the testimony of the child is not transcribed. 14
In reaching its conclusion, the Gunter court observed that
[i]t is arguable that for the sake of clarity we should announce a
prophylactic rule that the failure to transcribe a child's testimony
will by itself result in remand; certainly the failure is not to be
condoned. So far, however, our cases have only gone to the point
of ordering remand where given the failure to transcribe the child's
testimony, the record is too incomplete to permit us to discharge
our responsibility to exercise "the broadest type" of review. 144
This language from Gunter was quoted approvingly by the superior
court in Lewis 11 145 where the court refused to remand even though
no stenographer was present when the hearing judge questioned the
children in his chambers. 146  The Lewis II court held that "Gunter
...does not go [so] far as to require a custody case to be automati-
cally reversed and remanded "where an in-camera examination of a
child is made and no testimony is recorded." 147 Thus, if the re-
mainder of the record allows the superior court to perform its review-
ing function, it may not always reverse. Exactly how specific the rec-
ord must be, however, is unclear.
2. Presence of Counsel at the In Camera Interview
Recently the question of whether counsel must be present dur-
ing an in-chambers conference with a child has again become open to
140. See notes 124-38 and accompanying text supra.
141. 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976). The appeal arose from a lower court order
transferring the custody of a seven-year-old boy from his mother to his father. Id. at 384, 361
A.2d at 308. The child had lived with his mother since birth. Id. at 392, 361 A.2d at 313.
142. Id. at 385, 361 A.2d at 309.
143. id. at 386-89, 361 A.2d at 309-11.
144. Id. at 389, 361 A.2d at 311, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 266 Pa.
Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448
Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380 (1972).
145. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 414 A.2d 375 (1979). For further discussion of Lewis 11, see
notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra; notes 179-85 & 214-16 and accompanying text infra.
146. -_ Pa. Super. Ct. at _ 414 A.2d at 378. Both counsel, however, were present
during the interview in the judge's chambers. Id.
147. Id., citing Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. at 389, 361 A.2d at 311.
1979-4980]
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debate. Although Morales, Grillo, and subsequent cases 148 appear to
stand for the proposition that counsel must be present during the
interview, one case, not followed or mentioned in any subsequent
decision, suggests that a court does not always err when it questions
children in the absence of counsel. 149  In Cheppa v. Cheppa,150 the
court stated:
Notwithstanding the language of both Morales and Grillo, these
two cases actually turned on the absence of a record of the chil-
dren's testimony, rather than on the absence of counsel while the
children testified. A record was kept in the instant case. The rights
of both parents, of course, must be protected; however, the most
important consideration for the lower court when attempting to as-
certain the true feelings of a child must be to create an atmosphere
in which the child will feel free to express himself. Such a setting
is much less likely to exist when representatives of the parents
(. . . who are going to repeat what the child said) are present. The
hearing judge in the case before us made every effort to ask impar-
tial questions, to put the children at ease, and to attempt to de-
termine their true feelings towards their parents. Under the cir-
cuinstances of this case, there was no error by the lower court in
questioning the children without counsel being present.'
It should be noted, however, that three justices vehemently dis-
sented from the majority opinion in Cheppa and took the position
that the presence of counsel at an interview with the child is manda-
tory, whether or not the child's testimony is transcribed into the rec-
ord. 152 Again, it should be remembered that Cheppa has never
been cited in any subsequent case.
148. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lee v. Lee, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 161-62, 374 A.2d
1365, 1368-69 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Scott v. Rider, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 383, 285-87,
375 A.2d 149, 150-51 (1977). Regarding Morales and Grillo, see notes 123-39 and accompanying
text supra.
149. See Cheppa v. Cheppa, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 149, 151-52, 369 A.2d 854, 856 (1977).
150. 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 149, 369 A.2d 854 (1977).
151. id. at 151-52, 369 A.2d at 856.
152. Id. at 153-54, 369 A.2d at 857 (Price, J., dissenting), citing Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo
v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973). Joining in Judge Price's dissent were
Judges Hoffman and Spaeth. Judge Price wrote:
[T]he testimonv of these children was taken without the attorneys being present. This
procedure was specifically disapproved in Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster ....
Further, this error is compounded by the claim, admittedly unsupported by the record,
of appellant that a part of this in chambers testimony is missing. It is required that the
attorneys be present to safeguard a claim of this type, as well as others.
I would hold the lower court erred in its consideration and procedure relating to the
custody award. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the lower court . . . and re-
mand for a new hearing and determination of custody.
246 Pa. Super. Ct. at 154, 369 A.2d at 857 (Price, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 25: p. 752
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3. A Suggested Approach for the Practitioner
It is submitted that the course of action which best assures
adherence to proper procedure where testimony of children is in-
volved is for counsel to a) be present during an in-chambers examina-
tion of a child, 153 b) insist that a court stenographer transcribe the
child's testimony, 154 and c) remind the court of its legal obligation to
establish a complete record 155 of the hearing and to file a clear and
comprehensive opinion based upon that record.156 Such a strategy is
consistent with recent cases which have followed the rules set forth in
Morales, GriUo and Gunter despite any contrary indications from
Cheppa and Letvis JJ.157
In Commonwealth ex rel. Scott v. Rider,158 for example, the
superior court, in accordance with the dictates of Morales and Grillo,
held that the trial court's failure to transcribe the judge's interview
with the children, or to have counsel present, was error and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. 159 The concern expressed
by the Cheppa court that the presence of counsel might inhibit the
child's ability to testify freely 160 was implicitly rejected by the Scott
court as a justification for not having counsel present or for not trans-
cribing the interview. 161 Although the parties had agreed to the ab-
sence of counsel, 162 the Scott court added that the presence of coun-
sel is not a personal right of one of the parties which can be waived if
not asserted. 163 Any confidentiality problem, according to the court,
could be solved by impounding the record and making it available
only to the reviewing court. 164 Thus, Cheppa and Lewis II are of
limited vitality in this context, for counsel and transcription are most
likely still required.
C. The Bar's Suggestions for Eliminating the Confusion
The Family Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Association has
submitted proposed rules governing child custody cases to the
153. See notes 130-34 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 130-33 & 135-36 and accompanying text supra.
155. See notes 130-33 & 135-36 and accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 130-33 & 137-38 and accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 124-52 and accompanying text supra.
158. 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 383, 375 A.2d 149 (1977).
159. Id. at 385-87, 375 A.2d at 150-51.
160. See 246 Pa. Super. Ct. at 151-52, 369 A.2d at 856; text accompanying note 139 supra.
161. 248 Pa. Super. Ct. at 387, 375 A.2d at 151.
162. Id.
163. 1d. at 385, 375 A.2d at 150.
164. Id.
1979-1980]
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court Civil Rules Committee. 165 Included in
the proposal is a particular rule concerning the in camera interview of
the child, under which the court on its own motion, or upon the
request of either party, may conduct an oral examination of the
child. 166  Additionally, this rule requires that all such examinations
be recorded 167 and that they occur only in the presence of counsel,
who shall also have the right to examine the child.168 It is submitted
that this proposed rule, which would represent a statutory codifica-
tion of Gunter,6 9, will help to clarify the procedural requirements for
custody determinations and remedy the continued failure of trial
courts and attorneys to follow the procedural mandates set forth by
appellate courts for the in camera interview of the child.
V. THE PENNSYLVANIA APPROACH TO CHILD CUSTODY CASES
The Pennsylvania Superior Court's progressive approach to sub-
stantive child custody law1 70 has its roots in' that court's procedural
insistence on a broad scope of review, 171 a comprehensive inquiry, 172
and a decision supported by a complete and clear discussion of all the
evidence. 173 In case after case, the superior court pointed to areas of
deficiency in the record below, explained to the lower court where
165. PROPOSED RULES OF COURT, ACTIONS FOR CUSTODY, PARTIAL CUSTODY AND VISITA-
TION (1979) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED RULES]. The Board of Governors of the Pennsyl-
vania Bar Association unanimously approved these proposed rules prior to their submission to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Civil Rules Committee. It is submitted that, given the unani-
mous approval of the Board of Governors, the chances of the Committee adopting the proposed
rules are favorable.
166. PROPOSED RULES, Rule 1317(A), Examination of Child[ren]. Rule 1317(A) provides:
The Court may, on its motion, or upon the request of either party, conduct oral examina-
tion of the child[ren] who are the subject matter of the action. Such examination may or
may not be in the presence of the parties, but in all cases, counsel shall be present. All
such examinations shall be recorded. Counsel shall also have the right to examine the
child[ren].
Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See notes 141-44 and accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 108-09 and accompanying text supra.
171. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Morales v. Morales, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 375, 294
A.2d 782, 783 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Gifford v. Miller, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 269, 273, 248
A.2d 63, 66 (1968). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 443,
292 A.2d 380, 383 (1972) (superior court's scope of review characterized by Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court as "that of the broadest type").
172. See, e.g., In re Clause, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 396, 400, 368 A.2d 780, 782 (1976); Gunter
v. Gunter, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 382, 390, 361 A.2d 307, 311 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo
v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 235, 312 A.2d 58, 63 (1973).
173. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 144, 147, 331
A.2d 665, 667 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Fox, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 11, 17, 260 A.2d
470, 472-73 (1969).
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the hearing judge was remiss, and emphasized why it was necessary
to explore or even reexplore a particular facet of the case. 1 74
The only blemish on the superior court's record in recent child
custody cases may be that a measure of inconsistency exists as a result
of the court's attempts to deal with the issue of whether custody liti-
gation is, or should be, a truly adversarial process. The attitide of the
court towards this problem can be gleaned from a review of a number
of related issues.
A. Court-Ordered Counseling
In Letvis II,17' the superior court held that, because the lower
court had the authority and the duty to attempt to preserve a family
relationship, it had acted properly in ordering a custodial mother and
her children to undergo child-centered parental counseling in an ef-
fort to reestablish a normal relationship between the noncustodial
father and his children. 176 Unfortunately, however, Pennsylvania
trial courts have traditionally been reluctant to attempt to restore re-
lationships between parents and children by ordering counseling. It is
the authors' hope that the concept of counseling will be employed
more often by hearing judges in future custody cases. Since the hear-
ing judge is perhaps the only individual involved in the dispute who
objectively understands the conflicting positions of the parties and the
feelings of the children, he or she may be in the best position to
know when counseling will be beneficial. Court-ordered counseling
may not only save the family, 177 but it may also spare the court from
future litigation by parties seeking custody modifications, increased
visitation privileges, or contempt citations. 178
B. Independent Counsel for Children
There exists three possible approaches to the problem of whether
children should have independent counsel in a custody dispute: 1) all
174. For an in-depth review of this case law, see generally Note, supra note 1.
175. - Pa. Super. Ct. __, 414 A.2d 375. For further discussion of this case, see notes
112-14 & 145-47 and accompanying text supra; notes 214-16 and accompanying text infra.
176. - Pa. Super. Ct. at __ 414 A.2d at 377-78.
177. See DIVORCE CODE, supra note 92, § 102(a). Section 102(a) of the Code states that
"[t]he family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the family is of
paramount concern." Id.
178. For a detailed discussion of the advisability of a child having good relationships with
both the custodial and noncustodial parents, see Kaslow, Stages of Divorce: A Psycholegal
Perspective, Symposium: Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Family Law, 25 VILL. L. REV.
718, 730-40 (1980). The harm done by spiteful parents in keeping their children from their
ex-spouses is one of the reasons for the adoption of the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act.
See Frank, supra note 79, at 784-86, 796-801.
1979-1980]
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children should have independent counsel in every instance; 2) chil-
dren should never have independent counsel; and 3) children may
have independent counsel at the discretion of the court. Recently,
the superior court addressed this issue in Lewis JJ.179 In Lewis II,
two children intervened in the custody dispute between their parents
and argued through counsel that the failure of the lower court to
provide them with independent counsel constituted a denial of due
process of law.' 80 The intervening children contended that children
should be afforded independent counsel to protect their interests and
prevent them from becoming mere chattels in the custody dis-
pute. 181 In rejecting the intervenors' argument, the superior court
took the position that custody proceedings, unlike juvenile delin-
quency cases, contain "no inherent adversarial process with regard to
the children."182 The court refused to mandate that counsel should
be appointed in all custody cases because of the danger of placing the
child in an adversary position vis-a-vis his or her parents.' 83 The
Lewis II court, however, did not disagree totally with the position of
the intervenors, for it stated:
Certainly, we agree that in some custody disputes the children do
need someone to advance and protect their interests. We think,
however, that the trial courts are sufficiently astute to appreciate
the situation when it arises and act accordingly. Thus, we will re-
frain from a ruling which mandates counsel for children in all cus-
tody cases. 184
It is submitted that the superior court in Lewis II adopted the
correct viewpoint on the matter of independent counsel for children.
While the trial court must exercise its discretion, the thorough appel-
late review of all facts and issues is sufficient to protect the child's
interests because the case will be remanded in the event of any abuse
of discretion.'8 5 It is further submitted that this procedure should be
codified to ensure uniform adherence to it. It is for this reason that
the proposed rules of the Pennsylvania Bar Association specifically
provide for the discretionary appointment of counsel on the court's
own motion or at the request of either party. 1'8 6
179. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 414 A.2d 375. For further discussion of this case, see notes
112-14, 145-47 & 175-76 and accompanying text supra; notes 214-16 and accompanying text
infra.
180. - Pa. Super. Ct. at __, 414 A.2d at 378.
181. Id.
182. 1d. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
183. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 414 A.2d at 379.
184. Id. (emphasis in original).
185. See notes 170-74 and accompanying text supra.
186. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 165, Rule 1317(B), Examination of Child[ren]. Rule
[VOL. 25: p. 752
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C. Psychiatric Examination of the Child and Parties
In Commonwealth ex rel. Weber v. Weber,'8 7 the lower court
awarded custody to a mother who testified that, as a result of depres-
sion over marital problems, she had spent time in a mental institution
before she and her husband had separated.' 88 Although the mother
stated her belief that her husband had a drinking problem, she did
not complain about his care of the children while he had custody of
them.' 8 9 The superior court vacated the order and remanded the
case because the lower court had failed to provide a comprehensive,
reasoned analysis, 190 and because the record itself was incom-
plete. 191 More specifically, the court pointed out that, in light of the
mother's contention that the father had a drinking problem and the
father's allegation that the mother was mentally unstable and incapa-
ble of giving her children proper care, the record, which contained
only the opinions of the parties on these two matters, was inadequate
for lack of an expert's opinion.192 In vacating the lower court's order,
the superior court declared that "[o]n remand the court should con-
sider any additional evidence which is relevant to the issue of the
custody of the three children including, in particular, expert tes-
timony on the psychiatric conditions of both parents." 193
It seems apparent from the language and circumstances of Weber
that the court was directing the lower court to order that both par-
ents undergo psychiatric examination. Clearly the mother's mental
health was at issue, 194 but, except for the uncorroborated allegation
that he had a drinking problem, the father's mental health was never
questioned. 195 Furthermore, from the opinion, it does not appear
that either party requested a psychiatric examination, so the lower
court could not be accused of abusing its discretion in failing to honor
such a request. Consequently, it is unclear whether the Weber court
was announcing a general examination rule-which would require
1317(B) provides that "'[tlhe Court may, on its motion, or upon the request of either party,
appoint independent counsel for the child[ren]." Id.
187. - Pa. Super. Ct. __, 414 A.2d at 682.
188. Id. at -, 414 A.2d at 683.
189. Id.
190. Id. at -, 414 A.2d at 684-85. For a discussion of the superior court's requirement of
a comprehensive and reasoned analysis in custody cases, see notes 170-74 and accompanying
text supra.
191. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 414 A.2d at 684.
192. Id.
193. Id. at __ n.2, 414 A.2d at 684 n.2, citing Wood v. Tucker, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 461,
332 A.2d 191 (1974). For a discussion of the requirement that expert opinion must be subject to
cross-examination in custody cases, see notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
194. See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
195. See note 189 and accompanying text supra.
1979-1980]
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss4/7
778 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 25: p. 752
expert testimony any time a question is raised as to a parent's mental
health-or whether the court was merely remanding because, on the
facts of the case, the record was so insufficient as to hinder the court
in its appellate function.
The superior court in Rupp v. Rupp, 196 however, appears to
have resolved this issue in favor of establishing a broad rule of law
requiring a psychiatric examination of both parents and children. In
Rupp, neither parent was challenged as being unfit and, indeed, the
court agreed that both parents were fit to care for their child. 197
Commenting on the scant record before it, the superior court found
that the trial court had failed in its duty to investigate the case
thoroughly. 198 Significantly, the court observed that no psychologist
or psychiatrist had examined the child or the parents. 199 Thus, al-
though there is no firm holding on this issue, in view of the holdings
and circumstances of Weber and Rupp, it seems that the superior
court requires a psychological or psychiatric examination of both the
parents and the child, if old enough, in every child custody case in
order to produce a complete record. 200
It is submitted, however, that, an absolute requirement for
psychological or psychiatric evaluation in every custody case would be
unwise. First, it would constitute a waste of all the parties' time to
require'such an evaluation involving two clearly fit parents with
well-adjusted children. Second, the possibility exists that hearing
judges will rely too heavily on the experts, rubber-stamping their
opinions and abdicating the responsibility of the court to make the
determination. 20 1 Finally, the reliability of the psychological or
psychiatric examination appears open to question when one considers
the necessarily brief contact that the expert will have had with the
parents and children.
A better solution, and one left open by the lack of a firm holding
in Rupp, is contained in rule 1316(A) of the Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion's proposed rules. 20 2 This provision would permit a psychological
196. -. Pa. Super. Ct. -, 408 A.2d 883 (1979).
197. Id. at -, 408 A.2d at 884.
198. Id.
199. Id. at , 408 A.2d at 885.
200. See also Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. at 402, 361 A.2d at 318. The court in
Rupp used language very similar to that employed in Gunter. Compare id. with Rupp v. Rupp,
- Pa. Super. Ct. _ 408 A.2d at 885. In view of the similarity of expression, it would
appear that the development is not recent.
201. Cf. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (thorough analysis and
evaluation of expert testimony of psychiatrist and psychologist conducted by the court).
202. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 165, Rule 1316(A), Physical and Mental Examination.
Rule 1316(A) provides:
[W]here the physical or mental condition of a party is in controversy in the action, the
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or psychiatric examination only when the mental condition of a party
or child is at issue, and-in the case where a party is to be
examined-only when the party gives his or her express consent. 20 3
It is hoped that this rule will avoid the dangers mentioned above
which would be inherent in a blanket rule prescribing a mental
examination in every instance.
D. Determining the Best Interests of the Child-Adversary
or Nonadversary Proceedings?
In striving for open and full custody proceedings to determine
the best interests of the child, the superior court has had occasion to
consider the question of whether custody cases are adversary pro-
ceedings. Several statements by the court, however, reveal an incon-
sistent approach to this issue.
Illustrative of the superior court's ambiguous pronouncements
regarding the adversarial nature of custody cases are the Kessler 204
and Sipe v. Shaffer 205 decisions. Regarding the admissibility of re-
ports into evidence without the author of the report being subjected
to oath, examination, and cross-examination, the Kessler court held,
without exception, that a report which is received into evidence must
be substantiated in court by the person who made it, irrespective of
whether an objection is raised.20 6 This decision is clearly based upon
the court's view that all factors need to be explored. 20 7
On the other hand, in Sipe, the superior court upheld the ad-
missibility of a report of a probation officer who, although present in
court, did not testify. 208  The report was admitted despite the court's
seemingly absolute duty, under Kessler, to put the probation officer
on the stand. 20 9 The superior court apparently justified the admis-
sion of the report on the ground that the parties had jointly agreed to
Court, upon consent of the party to be examined, shall direct an examination by a qual-
ified and impartial physician or psychologist. Where the physical, mental or emotional
condition of the child[ren] is in issue, the Court may order such examination upon motion
of any party.
Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. - Pa. Super. Ct. __, 412 A.2d 605 (1979). See notes 71-75 and accompanying text
supra.
205. - Pa. Super. Ct. 396 A.2d 1359 (1979).
206. - Pa. Super. Ct. at __, 412 A.2d at 607. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text
supra.
207. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 412 A.2d at 607.
208. - Pa. Super. Ct. at __, 396 A.2d at 1364.
209. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
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its admission, 210 a holding difficult to reconcile with Kessler. What is
especially significant about this inconsistency is the language which
the court used to create it. Such phrases as "joint exhibit" and "no
objection was made" 211 indicate that the court still regarded the pro-
ceedings as somewhat adversarial in nature.
In comparison, the Lewis II 212 and Weber 213 rulings represent a
nonadversarial approach to custody law. In Lewis II, the court opined
that "most custody cases reflect a genuine parental love for the chil-
dren." 214  As evidence of its belief that there is no adversarial ele-
ment with respect to children involved in a custody suit, the court
held that the provision of independent counsel for children was not
mandatory. 215  The apparent rationale for this holding was that the
superior court's broad standard of review would ensure that trial
courts would take every possible measure to obtain and consider all
relevant evidence, thus making an adversary proceeding unnecessary
to test the veracity of a witness or an author of a report.216
Similarly, in Weber, the court discarded all pretense of an adver-
sary custody proceeding when, sua sponte, it remanded the case to
the hearing judge with a directive that both parents undergo
psychiatric examinations and that the psychiatrist be present in court
for purposes of examination and cross-examination.2 17  It is suggested
that, in keeping with the nonadversarial approach of Lewis II and
Weber, waivers of required procedures by counsel, such as the
superior court accepted in Sipe,218 should not be tolerated as a jus-
tification for the court's failure to develop a complete trial record. 219
210. - Pa. Super. Ct. at __, 396 A.2d at 1364. The court stated:
In the present case, however, the probation officer's report was introduced at the hearing
with both parties and both counsel present; the probation officer was present; and no one
objected to the admission of the report which was made part of the record as a "Joint
Exhibit." The hearing judge therefore did not err in admitting and considering the report.
Id. In a footnote, the court continued, remarking that
[olur reference to the presence of counsel and the fact that no objection was made per-
tains only to the conclusion that the probation officer's report was made part of the
record and thus that its admission was not violative of Wood v. Tucker. . . .This refer-
ence in no way involves the issue of waiver and does not therefore undercut the rule that
waiver does not obtain in a child custody dispute.
Id. at - n.8, 396 A.2d at 1364 n.8, citing Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 382, 361
A.2d 307 (1976); 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 461, 332 A.2d 191 (1974).
211. See note 210 supra.
212. See notes 112-14, 145-47, & 179-85 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 187-95 and accompanying text supra.
214. - Pa. Super. Ct. at __, 414 A.2d at 379.
215. Id.
216. See id; notes 170-74 and accompanying text supra.
217. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 414 A.2d at 684.
218. See notes 208-11 and accompanying text supra.
219. See also Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 382, 390, 361 A.2d 307, 311 (1976). In
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In addition to Lewis 11 and Weber, other cases likewise dem-
onstrate that the superior court is desirous of removing adversarial
barriers to a full and complete hearing in determining what is the
child's best interests. 220 For example, the decisions in Common-
wealth ex rel. Cox v. Cox 221 and Lewis v. Lewis (Lewis 1)222 indicate
that trial courts must assist counsel in developing all pertinent aspects
of the case to ensure that the superior court will have a complete
record if an appeal is taken. 22 3  In Cox, the court remanded for an
independent evaluation of the conditions of the parties' homes, even
though there was already testimony on this question from neighbors
and from the parties themselves.2 2 4  In Lewis I, the superior court
affixed an affirmative duty on the trial court "if necessary to develop
the record itself."2 2 5  It is submitted that these cases, along. with
Weber and Lewis H1, are more indicative of the trend in the superior
court than is Sipe, which should be limited to its facts.
From this discussion, it is apparent that the superior court is
demanding that custody cases receive extremely careful attention in
the courts below. The court has recognized that its goal of placing a
child with the party who will serve his or her best interests can be
better achieved by the adoption and promotion of a nonadversarial
atmosphere during the proceeding. By making relevant evidence
more accessible without the strictures found in adversary proceed-
ings, the court can amass sufficient information upon which to base a
sound custody decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the abolition of the tender years presumption, 226 the path
was cleared for courts to develop more fully the best interests of the
child standard.22 7 Although some presumptions persist, they are
gradually losing force.22 8  Those presumptions which do remain do
Gunter, the court refused to accept the father's waiver argument, stating that the child "had a
right to expect that the hearing judge would follow prescribed procedures. That right was not
one that the hearing judge could ignore, or that either parent could waive." Id. (citation omit-
ted).
220. See notes, 221-25 and accompanying text infra.
221. 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 388 A.2d 1082 (1978).
222. - Pa. Super. Ct. __, 406 A.2d 781 (1979).
223. See id. at -, 406 A.2d at 783-84; 255 Pa. Super. Ct. at 510-12, 388 A.2d at 1083-84.
224. 225 Pa. Super. Ct. at 511, 388 A.2d at 1083.
225. - Pa. Super. Ct. at __, 406 A.2d at 784.
226. See notes 6-29 and accompanying text supra.
227. See notes 65-225 and accompanying text supra.
228. See notes 30-64 and accompanying text supra.
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not carry the strength and weight of the tender years presumption
and can be overcome relatively easily.2 29
Evidentiary rules are changing to accommodate the best interests
standard. The burden of proof in custody cases is now shared by both
contesting parents. 2 30 Most evidentiary reports, such as those by
doctors concerning the mental or physical condition of the parties, or
those of social workers regarding the suitability of a parent's home,
are. inadmissible unless the authors are produced for cross-
examination. 231 The strict application of res judicata has been lim-
ited in custody cases. 232 It is difficult to assert privilege effectively,
and the constitutional right to privacy, although prevailing in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, arguably does not carry the same weight in
private custody disputes.233 Finally, the fact that one parent is en-
gaged in a meretricious relationship is not, of itself, a sufficient
ground for denial of custody or visitation rights, absent a showing of
detrimental effect on the child.2 34
Although the requirements with respect to the in-court examina-
tion of a child are often unclear,2 35 a practitioner will have complied
with proper procedure if he or she 1) insists upon being present dur-
ing in-chambers conferences, 2) demands a transcription of the child's
testimony, and 3) reminds the court that reversible error is a possibil-
ity absent a comprehensive record and court opinion.2 36
The considerations enumerated above are component parts of the
Commonwealth's serious and thorough approach to child custody
cases. 237 Appellate courts, exercising a scope of review of the
broadest type,23 8 have created an approach to custody law which re-
quires a full and unfettered investigation by all parties involved, in-
cluding the court, in order to determine how the child's best interests
will be served.23 9 Under this approach, courts have the discretion to
order counseling,240 independent counsel for children, 24' or psychiat-
ric examinations of the child and the parties.2 42
229. See notes 30-64 and accompanying text supra.
230. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
231. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
232. See notes 76-88 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 89-116 and accompanying text supra.
234. See notes 117-22 and accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 141-52 and accompanying text supra.
236. See notes 124-39 & 153-64 and accompanying text supra.
237. See notes 171-225 and accompanying text supra.
238. See notes 144 & 171 and accompanying text supra.
239. See notes 108-10 & 171-74 and accompanying text supra..
240. See notes 175-76 and accompanying text supra.
241. See notes 179-86 and accompanying text supra.
242. See notes 187-203 and accompanying text supra.
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In summary, the best interests standard now mandates full and
open custody hearings which are less adversarial in nature than other
types of legal proceedings.2 4 3 As a result, custody law in Pennsyl-
vania is truly an area of law in transition-a transition which appro-
priately marks the recognition of the court, not as a battleground for
custody-seeking parties, but rather as a forum in which the child's
interests are paramount.
243. See notes 204-25 and accompanying text supra.
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